In February 2025, President Trump escalated the U.S.-China trade war by imposing an additional 10% tariff on all Chinese imports. In this Q&A, Dr. Jack Zhang walks us through the timeline of the trade war and discusses its impact on the economy, technology, academia, and people. “The messy reality on the ground is quite different from the imaginary chessboards on which foreign policy elites in both countries are playing their little games of ‘strategic competition,’” Dr. Zhang said, reflecting on the tariffs and the broader U.S.-China trade war.

Dr. Zhang is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas (KU), director of the KU Trade War Lab, and associate director of the Center for East Asian Studies, a Public Intellectuals Program fellow with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and a former Wilson China Fellow at the Wilson Center. His recent projects investigate the determinants of U.S. foreign policy towards China, the politics of the U.S.-China trade war, and the national security implications of economic interdependence with China.

Can you briefly walk us through the history of the U.S.-China trade war? Where do we stand today, and what key developments have shaped the current state of economic relations?

In January 2018, the U.S. and China were the world’s two largest economies, each other’s largest trading partners, and arguably the two largest beneficiaries of globalization to date. The conventional wisdom at the time was that a “trade war” between these two interdependent economies would be unlikely and that economic “decoupling” would be impossible. By August of that year, the trade war would begin when the first of the Section 301 tariffs were imposed by Trump 45 and met with Chinese retaliatory tariffs. By 2019, average U.S. tariff levels on Chinese exports increased over six-fold to around 20% and a slew of other policy measures designed to curb Chinese competitiveness in emerging technologies were implemented as the conflict escalated.

In January 2020, the two sides signed the “Phase One” trade deal, aiming to ease tensions but keeping most tariffs in place. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the implementation of this deal and the conventional wisdom became that “decoupling” from China was prudent, if not inevitable.

Biden kept the existing Trump tariffs and introduced additional trade restrictions, particularly targeting China’s semiconductor sector. They also doubled tariffs on solar cells and more than tripled tariffs on lithium-ion electric vehicle batteries imported from China in 2024. And since returning to office, Trump 47 has escalated the trade war by imposing a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports in February 2025.

For a more complete timeline and discussion of why this cycle of escalation was not inevitable, I would refer your readers to a report I wrote for the Wilson Center. In this report, I argue that the trade war has become a war of attrition, that grows costlier by the day without yielding measurable strategic benefits that were initially promised.

With the additional 10% tariff on all Chinese imports, U.S. president Donald Trump reignited the trade war. What does this new 10% tariff signify, and how does it compare to the policies from his first administration in terms of context and underlying motives?

Reignite implies that the trade war was smoldering or dormant until 2024, the reality is that it was already burning brighter under Biden and jumped the last fire break with this latest escalation of 10% tariff on all Chinese imports. The new Trump tariffs cover ALL Chinese imports, making this escalation broader than before. Whereas in the first trade war, about two-thirds of Chinese imports were hit, now everything is subject to tariffs.

This recent tariff also signifies a shift in both strategy and objectives compared to Trump’s first term. During Trump 45, tariffs had mixed motives—partly economic, partly political—ultimately aimed at securing a “shiny” trade deal that would look good for reelection. This is how they got the Phase One agreement in 2020. But any hopes of de-escalation was scotched by mutual recriminations over mishandling the COVID fallout when the U.S.-China relationship spiraled.

Now, I believe the goal is “decoupling” from China. I haven’t seen any indication that these new tariffs are meant to push China back to the negotiation table for a Phase Two deal. I think the Trump team means what they say. I just worry that they are taking all the wrong lessons from the Trump 45 trade war. They seem to believe that tariffs were neither economically or politically costly, that businesses could weather them without special exemptions, and that the U.S. had the upper hand in negotiations and was overly cautious. I think this is why the current administration are confidently escalating trade fights not only with China but with other countries.

For consumers, tariffs mean that everyday products, including those previously shielded from tariffs, will become more expensive. The new tariffs will impact college students by making smartphones, laptops, and video game consoles up to 10% more expensive as businesses pass on these additional costs because most of these products come from China.

Trump also imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico. How did the motives and strategies behind the tariffs on China differ from those two countries?

I think the motives and strategies behind Trump’s tariffs on China differ significantly from the tariff threats against Canada and Mexico. Tariffs on Canada and Mexico are more about leverage in trade and diplomatic negotiations rather than long-term economic decoupling.

First, it’s important to note that Trump 45 negotiated the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to replace NAFTA. CJ Mahoney, the Kansas native who led those negotiations, suggested in a recent interview that the administration was looking to the next round of USMCA renegotiations ahead of the July 2026 deadline for reviewing the agreement. This implies a more cooperative, albeit tough, bargaining strategy with Canada and Mexico, in contrast to the outright hostility toward China. It also explains why the implementation of the 25% tariffs threatened earlier this month have been suspended until March 4.

Another key distinction is that the Trump administration does not see Canada and Mexico as national security threats in the same way it viewed China, despite the “national emergency” rhetoric. There’s a difference between the legal justification for tariffs and the strategic intention. Canada and Mexico are key U.S. allies with many defenders in Washington while there is a bipartisan consensus that views China as an adversary. I think this is why financial markets have discounted the likelihood of a full-blown trade war with Canada and Mexico. Miscalculations can happen when tariffs are used as a pressure tactic, as they did back in 2018, but the likelihood of some sort of deal is high.

Beijing retaliated swiftly, stating that “trade and tariff wars have no winners.” Do you agree? What are the likely effects of the ongoing trade war on both the U.S. and Chinese economies?

I think the standard view among economists is that trade wars and tariffs have no winners. The reality in a world of global value chains is that trade creates both winners and losers within countries and industries, so countries both win and lose from tariffs. For example, while U.S. tariffs on washing machines increase the cost for U.S. consumers, they are supposed to help import competing American producers like Whirlpool. But in reality, Whirlpool was also hurt by tariffs because they import parts and components from China and their Chinese competitors like Haier (which owns GE brand appliances) also makes washing machines in Kentucky. Similarly, Chinese retaliatory tariffs on U.S. wheat hurt farmers here in Kansas but also make noodles more expensive for poor Chinese families.

Economists consider tariffs to be a regressive tax because the burdens are proportionally higher on lower income households. There have been numerous studies estimating the cost of the trade war on higher consumer prices, trade diverted, and jobs lost (my Trade War Lab compiles a reading list of these studies for interested readers). I have a recent paper reporting the results of a survey of U.S. firms where the majority of respondents report being harmed by tariffs.

I believe tariffs are a blunt instrument that have failed to deliver on most of the policy outcomes promised while causing substantial economic harm to consumers and businesses in the U.S. and in China. At the same time, trade more generally is increasingly securitized. China has responded to U.S. tariffs and export controls by doubling down on indigenous innovation to reduce its reliance on U.S. markets and technology. This means that efforts to “de-risk” from China have engendered Chinese “de-risking,” which in turn fuels Western “de-risking” policies, creating an economic security dilemma that eats away at the mutually beneficial economic interdependence that underpins globalization.

There is a lot of misplaced enthusiasm among policymakers to “weaponize” economic interdependence in geopolitical contests. But, as a weapon, tariffs are like mustard gas: they do cause the target harm, but they cause a lot of collateral damage. There are two ways to end a war of attrition like the trade war. The first is for one of the sides to collapse (despite China’s recent economic slump, I do not think its collapse is imminent) and the second is for the two sides to stop pouring resources into the conflict and negotiate an armistice.

As the U.S.-China competition intensifies in advanced technologies – especially with the recent rise of DeepSeek – how have U.S. sanctions on semiconductors and chips impacted China’s domestic tech development? What trends or shifts do you foresee in the coming years?

U.S. sanctions on semiconductors and chips have undoubtedly impacted China’s domestic tech development, but their long-term strategic effectiveness remains an open question. My lab had produced a dataset on sanctions targeting China, including these high-tech export controls, and we hope to have a better answer to this question soon.

While U.S. sanctions raise costs for Chinese firms, Beijing has responded by intensifying efforts toward indigenous innovation. I believe major technology companies like Huawei and military end users, have found ways to circumvent these restrictions—whether through alternative supply chains, domestic R&D, or partnerships with non-U.S. suppliers. Other firms can adapt by stockpiling or innovating to reduce reliance on export-controlled technology, as evidenced by the rise of DeepSeek and its more energy and computationally efficient AI model using legacy chips it had stockpiled.

A historical precedent suggests that broad technological sanctions do not always achieve their intended outcomes against determined state actors. For instance, U.S. export controls in the 1990s on satellite technology and its decision to ban China from collaborating with NASA did not prevent China from advancing its space program. If anything, the Chinese government made its indigenous space program a higher strategic priority and it now has a more active manned space program than NASA. A more extreme example is North Korea’s ability to advance its nuclear weapons program despite decades of crippling sanctions. This is not to say that economic sanctions did not have any effect; they almost certainly diverted state resources from other sectors of the economy and carry a large human cost (in the case of North Korea), just not the intended strategic effect.

That said, sanctions are accelerating the broader trend of U.S.-China “decoupling,” leading to increasingly separate technology ecosystems. While large Chinese firms may adapt, smaller firms without extensive resources may struggle to stay in business. Moving forward, we can expect China to double down on self-sufficiency in key technologies on the one hand and try to cultivate deeper ties with alternative suppliers and markets on the other. Nether of these trends are particularly advantageous for the U.S. because party-state capitalism will gain strength in China while relations with its allies in Europe and Asia will be strained by sanctions busting.

Lastly, how does the U.S.-China trade war impact academia and students, whether directly or indirectly?

The U.S.-China trade war is one symptom of rising geopolitical competition and another is the China Initiative. Professor Franklin Tao here at KU lost his tenured position during the China Initiative. I moderated an event where his wife shared what his family went through to fight all the charges and ultimately to clear his name. It was a very moving testimony. Professor Tao was cleared of all charges in 2024 and is still fighting to get his job back. But his is just one of the hundreds of ethnically Chinese scientists who were similarly racially profiled by the China Initiative. A “reverse brain-drain” of Chinese scientists have left the U.S. since 2018 and there has been a sharp decline in research collaboration and productivity. I think more U.S. policymakers need to be aware of these negative unintended consequences of poorly thought-out policy because I expect more of the same from the current administration.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst the steady drumbeat of coming conflict with China, American public opinion towards China has turned sharply negative. As recently as 2011, a majority of Americans viewed China favorably. But by 2024, over 80 percent of Americans view China unfavorably and 40 percent see China as an “enemy.” It is unsurprising this animosity has translated into hate crimes like the stabbing of a Chinese student in Bloomington, Indiana in 2023. Chinese students use to be the largest population of international students in the U.S. but their numbers have declined noticeably in recent years and India has overtaken China as the largest sender of international students in 2024. I personally know several Chinese students who have been denied U.S. visa renewal midway through their studies.

I think the theme of this interview is the unintended consequences and unnecessary human toll that the trade war has caused. I was born in Shanxi province, in the Chinese heartland, and my family has achieved the American dream mostly in the American heartland. This is why so much of my research focuses on the impact of policies like the U.S.-China trade war on the common people of both countries, who bear the costs of these policies. I do not think policies that racially profile Chinese students or scholars are constitutional or enhance U.S. national security interests. I feel the same way about tariffs. The messy reality on the ground is quite different from the imaginary chessboards on which foreign policy elites in both countries are playing their games of “strategic competition.”